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INDIA: A MODEL FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
Lawrenz Fares* 
ABSTRACT 
Under the modern international human rights regime, all people are 
entitled to two categories of rights: civil and political rights and economic, 
social, and cultural rights. While the judicial enforcement of civil and 
political rights is commonly accepted in virtually every country in the world, 
there is a significant degree of hostility towards the judicial enforcement of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. Critics have long held that the 
enforcement of these rights in the courtroom would be inherently 
undemocratic and unmanageable. This belief, and the general aversion to the 
judicial enforcement of these rights, is primarily rooted in the fact that the 
enforcement of these rights would require compelling the government to 
spend vast sums of money in the form of welfare programs. However, India 
has overcome these criticisms and emerged as a model for the enforcement 
of these rights. The following paper will serve to lay a foundational 
understanding of the modern international human rights regime, look to the 
functionality of both sets of rights, and examine how Indian jurisprudence 
has come to allow the enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights in 
the courtroom. From there, this paper will examine PUCL v. Union of India, 
the landmark case that recognized the right to food in India, the impact this 
case has on the lives of the Indian people, and the economic impact of 
protecting the right to food in an attempt to demonstrate that the judicial 
enforcement of these rights is not only possible, but can also be done in an 
effective manner. 
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I. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Today’s international human rights regime is governed by a body of 
documents that has come to be known as the “International Bill of Human 
Rights” (“IBHR”).1 In its current form, the IBHR consists of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the ICCPR’s two 
Optional Protocols.2 The UDHR, the IBHR’s foundational component, was 
drafted and intended to be a representation of the “universal recognition that 
basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings, 
inalienable and equally applicable to everyone.”3 The UN’s then 48 members 
unanimously adopted the UDHR in 1948 in recognition of the “necessity of 
transforming human rights into legally binding obligations.”4 However, the 
UDHR, consisting of a preamble and thirty articles, contained only broad 
references to now commonly accepted fundamental rights such as the right 
to life, liberty, and security, as well as other rights that would later come to 
be recognized as either civil and political or economic, social, and cultural 
rights.5 As commentators have noted, the UDHR went “little beyond the bare 
declaration of rights to provide.”6 
In light of the generalized nature of the UDHR, many pro-human rights 
thinkers came to the realization that additional treaties and covenants would 
be required to properly address the vast variety of human rights issues the 
world faced.7 However, it would be a long eighteen (18) years before the 
ICCPR and ICESR were adopted by the U.N. and then another ten (10) years 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The 
International Bill of Rights (1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en 
.pdf [hereinafter UN Fact Sheet]. 
2 Id. 
3 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ 
sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2018). 
4 Elif Gozler Camur, Civil and Political Rights vs. Social and Economic Rights: A Brief Overview, 
6 J. BITLIS EREN U. SOC. SCI. 206, 207 (2017); DAVID A. SHIMAN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A 
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 3 (1999). 
5 SHIMAN, supra note 4, at 3. 
6 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 159 (2013). 
7 Camur, supra note 4, at 206. 
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before both covenants entered into effect.8 Commentators have credited this 
temporal gap, as well as the underlying ideological differences between the 
two documents, to the Cold War and the international struggle between 
Communism and Capitalism.9 
In shaping the international human rights regime, the Capitalist West 
“aimed to reduce human rights to the traditional concept of civil and political 
rights.”10 Civil and political rights are seen as “negative rights.”11 These kinds 
of rights are those that limit a government’s ability to act in some manner.12 
One may think of the right to freedom of speech as such a negative right. 
That right, as commonly understood, prohibits governmental entities from 
interfering with an individual’s right to express himself as he sees fit. In this 
light, negative rights are a freedom from something. With regards to the right 
to free speech, it is a freedom from unwarranted restrictions on one’s ability 
to express themselves. As a result of this understanding, negative rights are 
often thought of as “free” rights.13 That is to say, the government incurs 
virtually no economic cost in protecting negative rights as these rights do not 
require the government to take any sort of affirmative action but rather avoid 
taking certain actions that would infringe on what the right in question 
protects. 
The Socialist East, on the other hand, sought to further a system based 
predominantly on economic, social, and cultural rights.14 These rights stand 
in stark contrast to civil and political rights. They are seen as “positive” rights 
and, in terms of functionality, can be fairly viewed as the polar opposite of 
negative civil and political rights.15 Positive rights may be understood not as 
a freedom from something but an affirmative right to something. For 
instance, take the ICESR’s right to “an adequate standard of living” found in 
Article 11.16 Under ICESR, this right includes the right to “adequate food, 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 UN Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
9 See Camur, supra note 4, at 206; see also SHIMAN, supra note 4, at 5. 
10 Camur, supra note 4, at 206. 
11 Linda M. Keller, The Indivisibility of Economic and Political Rights, 1 HUM. RTS. & HUM. 
WELFARE 9, 10 (2001). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Camur, supra note 4, at 206. 
15 Keller, supra note 11, at 10. 
16 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESR] (entered into forced Jan. 3, 1976). 
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clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions.”17 Theoretically, to protect the right to an adequate standard of 
living, a country must thus expend significant financial resources to ensure 
that all of its citizens are adequately clothed, fed, and sheltered. It is for this 
reason that economic, social, and cultural rights are “seen as enormously 
costly, requiring massive state-provided welfare.”18 
These differences in the economic cost of enforcing these rights impact 
the manner through which each set of rights is implemented.19 Although 
commonly seen as “free,” civil and political rights still require the 
government to maintain an adequate court system filled with qualified judges 
to apply the laws and a professional police force to enforce them.20 
Nonetheless, these costs are seen as minimal in comparison to the 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights. Thus, many argue 
that “the obligations under the ICCPR [are] absolute and immediate and that, 
therefore, a State could only become a party to the ICCPR after, or 
simultaneously with, its taking the necessary measures to secure those 
rights.”21 In other words, civil and political rights are expected to be 
implemented immediately through the adoption of domestic laws which 
enshrine these rights and the development of an adequate court system to 
apply said laws as virtually all countries, to some extent, have the resources 
available to do so with relative haste.22 
A more progressive approach is taken in regard to implementing 
economic, social, and cultural rights.23 Under Article II of the ICESR: 
Each State Party to the present covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technically to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present covenant 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Id. 
18 Keller, supra note 11, at 10. 
19 See id. 
20 Camur, supra note 4, at 207. 
21 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 12 (1991). 
22 See id.; see also Camur, supra note 4, at 207. 
23 Keller, supra note 11, at 10. 
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by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.24 
Making the implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights 
contingent on the resources available to a given nation “reflects [the UN’s] 
recognition that the realization of these rights can be hampered by a lack of 
resources and can be achieved only over a period of time.”25 Indeed, as Aryeh 
Neier, a co-founder of Human Rights Watch, has noted, the implementation 
of economic, social, and cultural rights effectively requires “a broad 
redistribution of society’s resources [and/or] its economic burdens.”26 Such 
a redistribution cannot be realistically undertaken in a short period of time, 
thus this progressive approach provides developing nations with a path to full 
implementation while not, strictly speaking, violating their obligations under 
the ICESR. 
However, implementation is only half the battle. Once a nation has 
implemented all or some of the rights contained in the ICESR, they must still 
develop a method of enforcement. Unlike civil and political rights, which are 
commonly enforced in courts the world over, the justiciability of economic, 
social, and cultural rights frequently comes under fire.27 According to 
commentators, this is largely due to the fact that “very few western legal 
systems have made provision for the enforcement of economic, social, and 
cultural rights such as the right to health or housing.”28 Criticism concerning 
the justiciability of these rights typically takes one or both of the following 
forms: 1) judicial enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights is 
inherently undemocratic; or 2) courts lack the expertise to interpret and 
enforce these rights.29 
Neier, a vocal opponent of the judicial enforcement of economic, social, 
and cultural rights, does well to encapsulate the criticisms that fall into the 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 ICESR, supra note 16, art. II(e) (emphasis added). 
25 Key Concepts on ESCRs—What are the Obligations of States on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights?, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/ 
Pages/WhataretheobligationsofStatesonESCR.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
26 Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Jan. 2006, at 1, 1. 
27 See generally JOHN TOBIN, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, & CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE CHARTER OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES—A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION 7 (2010). 
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. at 14. 
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first category.30 Neier maintains that rights such as the rights to housing, 
education, social security, a job, and to healthcare are within the territory of 
a democratic nation’s legislature.31 Accordingly, he believes these rights are 
“unmanageable through the judicial process” and that their justiciability 
would “[intrude] fundamentally into an area where the democratic process 
ought to prevail.”32 This argument is rooted in Neier’s belief that “the 
purpose of the democratic process is essentially to deal with two questions: 
public safety and the development and allocation of a society’s resources.”33 
Thus, these matters, he argues, must be questions for public debate.34 To him, 
granting courts jurisdiction over such matters “is to carve the heart out of that 
process.”35 
Criticisms in the second category build on this position and typically 
advance an argument along the lines of: “courts do not have access to the 
relevant information and/or lack the expertise to examine the complex issues 
that arise from the development of social policy and the allocation of scarce 
resources.”36 Implicit in this position is the belief that courts are arbitrators 
of law and the enforcement of such rights would call for the court to reach 
beyond the letter of the law and into matters of social policy when crafting a 
remedy that will more likely than not entail the reallocation of the society’s 
resources. In so doing, the court is entering an area where, typically, among 
Western states, the legislature is considered the most competent 
governmental organ. 
However, some countries, such as India, have developed models for the 
judicial enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights through 
significant judicial activism that arguably overcome the criticisms commonly 
thrown at the justiciability of these rights. 
                                                                                                                           
 






36 TOBIN, supra note 27, at 10. 
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II. THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
The Constitution of India was adopted on November 26, 1949, one (1) 
year after the adoption of the UDHR, and sixteen (16) years prior to the 
adoption of both the ICCPR and ICESR.37 Because the drafting of the 
Constitution occurred alongside the international deliberations concerning 
the UDHR, the international human rights movement heavily influenced the 
structure and function of the Indian Constitution.38 One should note, 
however, the Constitution’s visionary nature. Even without any guidance in 
regard to enforcement mechanics for positive rights from the UDHR, and the 
complete absence of ICSER, India managed to create a model to implement 
both negative civil and political and positive economic, social, and cultural 
rights on its own, although, initially, the Constitution itself did not allow for 
judicial enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights.39 
The path to enforcement began with the drafters of the Constitution 
dividing the two categories of rights into two separate parts: Part III, 
governing what are known in India as “Fundamental Rights” and Part IV, 
which contains what are called “Directive Principles of State Policy” 
(DPSP).40 Included in these Fundamental Rights are the civil and political 
rights to equality, freedom, life (a right of particular import to future 
jurisprudence), the right against exploitation, freedom of religion, and rights 
protecting the interests of minorities and their access to educational 
institutions.41 Article thirty-two (32) of the Constitution expressly makes 
these rights justiciable, stating, in pertinent part: 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme 
Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs . . . for the 
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.42 
Part IV, the DPSP’s, contains the economic, social, and cultural rights 
such as the rights to a minimization of inequality in income, an “adequate 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 PR VISHNU, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 204–05 (2014). 
38 Id. at 204. 
39 Id. 
40 Jayna Kothari, Commentary, Social Rights and the Indian Constitution, 2 L., SOC. JUST. & 
GLOBAL DEV. J. (2005), https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_2/kothari. 
41 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, arts. 14, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29. 
42 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, art. 32(1)–(2). 
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means of livelihood,” health, humane working conditions and maternity 
relief, and the preservation and improvement of agriculture and animal 
husbandry.43 However, Article thirty-seven (37), Part IV’s second article, 
explicitly states that: 
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but 
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance 
of the country and shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making 
laws.44 
Although the Constitution made economic, social, and cultural rights non-
justiciable, the drafters of the Constitution made clear that they are 
“fundamental to the governance” of India and imposed upon the Indian 
government a “duty” to ensure these rights were considered in the legislative 
process.45 This commitment was reaffirmed in Article thirty-eight (38) of the 
Constitution, which reads: 
The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and 
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic, 
and political, shall inform all the institutions of national life.46 
Note that, with a great deal of foresight, the drafters of the Indian Constitution 
recognized, just as the drafters of the ICESCR would a decade and a half 
later, the best way to implement these rights would be through a “progressive 
realisation [sic] of rights.”47 
However, as has already been noted, the enforcement of economic, 
social, and cultural rights were still seen as beyond the scope of judicial 
authority.48 The proponents on non-justiciability voiced criticisms that fall in 
line with Neier’s view, arguing that allowing the courts to deal in such 
matters would be undemocratic.49 Specifically, they questioned “the 
legitimacy of empowering the judiciary to overrule the popular will as 
expressed through legislative activity.”50 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, arts. 38(2), 39(a), 39(e), 42. 
44 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, art. 47 (emphasis added). 
45 See id. 
46 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, art. 38(1). 
47 Kothari, supra note 40. 
48 Id. 
49 See id.; see also Neier, supra note 26, at 1. 
50 Kothari, supra note 40. 
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This view remained prominent in Indian jurisprudence until the late 
1960’s when a new jurisprudential philosophy known as “judicial populism” 
emerged in India’s Supreme Court.51 The Justices that adhered to and 
developed this philosophy “sought to mold the constitutional interpretation 
and doctrine in unmistakable and emotionally surcharged people-oriented 
ways.”52 A prominent example of early judicial populist rhetoric can be found 
in the matter of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 
a landmark decision which granted the Indian Supreme Court the power to 
review parliamentary constitutional amendments.53 In Kesavananda, the 
Court focused on the struggles of the “poor, starved and mindless millions 
who need the Court’s protection for securing to themselves the enjoyment of 
human rights.”54 In regards to securing this enjoyment of human rights, the 
Court stressed the importance of the economic, social, and cultural rights 
embodied in Part IV of the Constitution.55 The Court stated that: 
the moral rights embodied in Part IV of the Constitution are equally an essential 
feature of it, the only difference being that the moral rights embodied in Part IV 
are not specifically enforceable as against the State by a citizen in a Court of law 
in case the State fails to implement its duty but, nevertheless, they are fundamental 
in the governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the 
judiciary, are bound to enforce those directives.56 
Thus, while still being barred from declaring DPSP’s justiciable by Article 
thirty-seven (37), the Court recognized that they, too, were bound by the 
DPSP’s and that these principles would have to play an increasingly 
important role in Indian jurisprudence as the Court pivoted to a more people-
centric jurisprudence.57 
These philosophical underpinnings would take Indian jurisprudence by 
storm in the aftermath of the 1975–76 national state of emergency.58 The state 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 111 (1985). 
52 Id. 
53 Leila Choukroune & Michael Faure, Environmental Democracy and Access to Justice: A 
Comparative Law and Society Approach, 17 E. & CENT. EUR. J. ON ENVTL. L. 94, 97 n.247 (2012); see 
generally Kesavnanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India). 
54 Kesavnanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 948–49 (India). 
55 Id. at 949. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 949; see also CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950, art. 37. 
58 See Baxi, supra note 51, at 107. 
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of emergency began after then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was put under 
significant political pressure by her political opposition to resign for alleged 
abuses of the electoral system in the previous election.59 In response to this 
pressure, Gandhi declared a national state of emergency that empowered her 
to arrest vast numbers of her political opponents, impose government 
censorship on the press, and postpone elections.60 Numerous human rights 
violations were also carried out during this period, including the infamous 
forced sterilization of some 3.7 million people.61 
In light of the atrocities committed during the state of emergency, the 
Court sought to position itself as “the last resort for the oppressed and 
bewildered.”62 Holding true to the people-centric nature of judicial populism, 
the post-emergency Court tried to deal with the severe deprivation of rights 
seen during the emergency by focusing its attention on placing greater legal 
import on DPSP’s. The pivotal moment for the future of these rights 
presented itself two years after the end of the emergency in Maneka Gandhi 
v. Union of India. In Maneka, the Court turned its attention to Article twenty-
one’s (21) negative right to life found in Part III.63 The Article reads: 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.64 
The Maneka Court read this provision to be akin to the American doctrine of 
due process and “embraced a broad, purposive approach to the enunciation 
and enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights that verges on natural 
law.”65 Most importantly to the ends of this examination, the adoption of a 
due process approach enabled the Court to start “expanding the guarantee of 
the Right to Life in Article 21 to include within it and recognize [sic] a whole 
gamut of social rights.”66 And, indeed, over the course of the next two 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 RICHARD F. NYROP, INDIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 550 (1986). 
60 Id. 
61 ANATTH V. KRISHNA, INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: MAKING SENSE OF INDIAN POLITICS 173 
(2010). 
62 Baxi, supra note 51, at 109 (quoting State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 634 at 
70 (India)). 
63 See generally Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 (India); see also 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950 art. 21. 
64 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Jan. 26, 1950 art. 21. 
65 See A.H. Hawaldar, 2 Evolution of Due Process in India, 2 BHARATI L. REV. 107, 117 (2014); 
Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476, 480 (2003). 
66 Kothari, supra note 40 (emphasis added). 
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decades, the Indian Supreme Court recognized the economic, social, and 
cultural rights to “live with human dignity,” shelter, privacy, health and 
medical care, and to live in a pollution free environment as being 
incorporated into the justiciable right to life.67 Thus, in Maneka, the Court 
opened the door for individuals to bring claims to enforce their economic, 
social, and cultural rights against the government through Article 21.68 
III. PEOPLE’S UNION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES V. UNION OF INDIA: ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHT JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 
With our foundational understanding of economic, social, and cultural 
rights and Indian jurisprudence in place, we may now turn to an analysis of 
the practical judicial application and enforcement of these positive, welfare-
minded rights. The subject of this analysis will be the matter of People’s 
Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136, or, as it is 
more commonly known, the “Right to Food” case.69 While the Court has not 
yet passed its official judgment in this matter, it has been steadily issuing 
interim orders since 2001 that have gradually defined India’s constitutional 
right to food and methods of enforcement.70 
The matter arose out of the increasing starvation deaths of Indian 
citizens in the state of Rajasthan.71 At the time, the population was starving 
while Rajasthani officials kept excess grain in storage to be used only in the 
event of an officially decreed famine.72 Reports at the time were indicating 
that much of the grain in storage was rotting.73 Moreover, the citizens were 
not receiving “the required employment and food relief mandated by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 See Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 (India); see also Olga Tellis 
v. Bombay Municipal Corp., AIR (1985) 3 SCC 545 (India); Kharak Singh v. State of UP, (1964) 1 SCR 
332 (India); Parmananda Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286 (India); Doon Valley Rice, LTD. v. 
State Bank of India, AIR (1988) SC 111 (India). 
68 Kothari, supra note 40. 
69 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India). 
70 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors, In the Supreme Court of India, Civil 
Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition (Civil) No.196 of 2001, International Network for Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/peoples-union-civil-liberties-v-union-india-
ors-supreme-court-india-civil-original (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India). 
2019] INDIA: A MODEL FOR THE ENFORCEMENT 293 
 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2019) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2019.162 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Rajasthan Famine Code of 1962” and other government programs.74 Thus, in 
2001, the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (“PUCL”) filed a petition with 
the Indian Supreme Court seeking the enforcement of an economic, social, 
and cultural right to food under Article twenty-one (21) against both the state 
and federal government.75 
In their writ to the Supreme Court, the PUCL raised three “questions of 
law of public importance” which they asked the Court to address: 
1.) Does the right to life mean that people who are starving and 
who are too poor to buy food grains ought to be given food 
grains free of cost by the State from the surplus stock lying 
with the State, particularly when it is reported that a large 
part of it is lying unused and rotting? 
2.) Does not the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India include the right to food? 
3.) Does not the right to life which has been upheld by the apex 
Court imply that the State has a duty to provide food 
especially in situations of drought to people who are drought 
affected and are not in a position to purchase food?76 
In an order issued on July 23, 2001, the Court wrote: 
In our opinion, what is of utmost importance is to see that food is provided to the 
aged, infirm, disabled, destitute women, destitute men who are in danger of 
starvation, pregnant and lactating women and destitute children, especially in 
cases where they or members of their family do not have sufficient funds to 
provide food for them. In case of famine, there may be shortage of food, but here 
the situation is that amongst plenty there is scarcity. Plenty of food is available, 
but distribution of the same amongst the very poor and the destitute is scarce and 
non-existent leading to mal-nourishment, starvation and other related problems.77 
Although not using any explicit language to this effect, commentators believe 
that this passage serves as the Supreme Court’s response to the PUCL’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, The Right to Life is the Right to Food: People’s Union for 
Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Others, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 15, 15 (2010). 
75 Id. 
76 Kothari, supra note 40. 
77 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order 
dated July 23, 2001). 
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second question and therefore stands for the proposition that the right to food 
does in fact fall under the protection of Article 21.78 
Just four months later, the Supreme Court released another interim order 
on November 28, 2001, that “critically and expansively transformed PUCL 
by identifying which [state and federal] food schemes were to be considered 
legal entitlements79 under the constitutional right to food.”80 Interestingly, in 
this order, the Court showed no hesitation in directing how both the state and 
federal government should run food distribution programs.81 The order 
specifically identified three food-related government programs which, 
following the order, citizens would have a legal right to participate in.82 These 
three programs included the Targeted Public Distribution Scheme (“TPDS”), 
the Integrated Child Development Scheme (“ICDS”), and the Mid-Day Meal 
Scheme (“MDMS”). 
The TPDS is a program “through which grains are delivered to people 
of extreme poverty.”83 While the order stated that the Court found full 
compliance on behalf of the federal government in regard to the allotment of 
food, the Court still directed the federal government to take all necessary 
actions to bring state governments in compliance if they were found to be 
violating the terms of the program.84 Additionally, the Court directed the 
federal government to ensure that TPDS applications were freely available 
to those in need and required that they be both given and received free of 
charge to the citizen in question.85 
The second program, MDMS, according to India’s Ministry of Human 
Resource Development, is a program originally founded in 1925 “[w]ith a 
view to enhancing enrollment, retention, and [school] attendance while 
simultaneously improving nutritional levels among children.”86 Again, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Kothari, supra note 40. 
79 A term, which, in this context, is synonymous with “legal rights.” 
80 Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 74, at 15. 
81 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order 
dated November 28, 2001). 
82 Id. 
83 Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 74, at 15. 
84 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order 
dated November 28, 2001). 
85 Id. 
86 About the Mid Day Meal Scheme, MINISTRY OF HUM. RESOURCE DEV., http://mdm.nic.in (follow 
“About MDM” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
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Court found full compliance on behalf of the federal government but 
instructed them to take action against non-compliant state governments.87 
The Court then required that every state government in India “implement the 
Mid-Day Meal Scheme by providing every child in every Government and 
Government assisted Primary Schools with a prepared mid day meal . . . for 
a minimum of 200 days.”88 Lastly in regard to the MDMS program, the Court 
directed both federal and state governments to take action to ensure that the 
quality of grains provided under this scheme was satisfactory.89 
Lastly, the Court required the full universalization of the ICDS, a 
program aimed at improving the health, nutrition, and development of Indian 
children by offering health and nutrition programs to mothers, preschool 
education to children, and “supplementary feeding for all children and 
pregnant and nursing mothers.”90 Thus, under the Court’s order, all Indian 
children and mothers would have access to these services at an ICDS feeding 
center.91 
However, the actions taken by the Supreme Court in the November 
order pale in comparison to the directives handed down by the Court in yet 
another interim order dated October 7, 2004. There, more so than ever before, 
the Court directly engaged in what Neier called the “broad redistribution of 
society’s resources [and/or] its economic burdens.”92 In that order, the Court 
directly required the Indian government to allocate the requisite funding to 
the ICDS to raise the total financial allotment per child from one rupee93 to 
two.94 Although the move only required the government to raise the allotment 
from roughly one and a half U.S. cents ($0.015 USD) to three U.S. cents 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order 
dated November 28, 2001). 
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90 India—Integrated Child Development Services, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/ 
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91 Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 74, at 15. 
92 See Neier, supra note 26, at 1; People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 
S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order dated October 7, 2004). 
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($0.03 USD), the mandate essentially required the doubling of the ICDS 
budget just three years after the program’s full universalization.95 
IV. AFTERMATH OF THE INTERIM ORDERS 
The implementation of these orders has been viewed widely successful 
from a humanitarian standpoint, however, the orders have also significantly 
strained the Indian economy and its trade policies.96 Proponents of the actions 
of the Court have particularly spotlighted the improvements seen in the 
MDMS program following the Court’s intervention.97 Prior to the start of 
PUCL, the program was considered “poorly implemented, reaching only a 
handful of states throughout the country.”98 Moreover, the program only 
provided uncooked grains to students rather than fully-cooked, nutritionally-
sound meals.99 The fact that the MDMS program only provided uncooked 
grains also subjected food storages to “leakages” of food grain in the form of 
theft in order to sell the said grains on the black market.100 At the time of the 
drafting of the writ, only two Indian states properly implemented the 
program.101 
Then, the Court’s intervention “set off a spark that completely reversed 
the non-implementation of the MDMS in other states.”102 By making the 
program a legal entitlement and placing the responsibility to ensure this 
program functioned properly on both the federal and state governments, the 
Court created a program that was not only better organized and funded, but 
also more difficult to corrupt and more supportive of the nutritional needs of 
Indian children.103 Additionally, because the Court mandated that the 
program be free of charge, the program has since acted as a large incentive 
“for impoverished families to enroll their children in school and for children 
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96 Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the Right to 
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to attend at least the morning session prior to the meal, if not the full day” to 
ensure that their children are properly fed.104 As a direct result of the Court’s 
actions, the MDMS “has begun to be implemented more uniformly 
throughout India, and the nutritional content of the meals has greatly 
improved.”105 
Although the actions of the Court have positively impacted the food 
scheme programs and the lives of the individuals who use them, the interim 
orders have also strained a number of Indian economic policies.106 While the 
Court’s economic, social, and cultural right jurisprudence has given “the 
Supreme Court the power to regulate the administrative policies of the 
government as they relate to the distribution of food,” one must also 
recognize that the Court is simultaneously “issuing orders on specific 
government actions, [all the while] the Government of India engages in its 
own process of national and international food and agriculture regulations, 
many of which are aimed at precisely the same topics.”107 
Even though the interim orders in no way specifically mention Indian 
economic and trade policies, opting instead to focus on the supply and 
distribution of food, the country’s policies and the Court’s orders “are 
certainly in direct contact.”108 This has created an awkward dichotomy as the 
Court, fighting for the human-centric principles of judicial populism, is 
pulling these policies in the opposite direction of a government, who, since 
1991, has made “a shift from the socialist ideals of equality of income 
distribution embodied in India’s Constitution and underlying [economic, 
social, and cultural] cases such as PUCL to a new focus on aggregate 
numbers such as annual GDP growth.”109 
The government of India has been striving to do so through, not the 
universalization of food schemes as the Court has ordered, but rather a 
process of liberalization, privatization, and de-universalization of public food 
distribution with an aim at removing government regulations on all 




106 Birchfield & Corsi, Starvation, supra note 96, at 732. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 732–33. 
109 Id. at 733 (citing Steve Coll, S. Asian Reformers Face Tough Hurdles: India, Pakistan Shunning 
Socialist Ties, WASH. POST., Sept. 8, 1991, at A31). 
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“foodstuffs.”110 In so doing, the government is motivated by a belief that 
highly government-subsidized food distribution, in fact, increases poverty 
and starvation by flooding Indian markets with underpriced food goods.111 
India, the government believes, would be highly susceptible to these negative 
impacts of food subsidization as roughly 60% of the country’s population 
derives its income predominantly through agriculture.112 Thus, from the 
government’s economic perspective, the PUCL orders are directly at odds 
with what is needed for the economic health of the country.113 And, indeed, 
these “[d]eregulation measures operate with different goals that PUCL’s 
right to food objectives and directly clash with PUCL’s orders for more 
government action and the reinstatement of [previously] dismantled 
schemes.”114 
However, contrary to the government’s stance, the universalization and 
budgetary increases mandated by the Supreme Court may have had a large, 
positive impact on the Indian economy.115 As one World Bank report has 
indicated, malnutrition also perpetuates poverty.116 Specifically in regards to 
India, the World Bank has found that the malnutrition of its citizens and the 
inefficiency hunger produces in the labor force, including the agricultural 
workers the government seeks to protect, may have cost India upwards of 
$2.5 billion USD each year.117 Thus, by continuing to abide by the PUCL’s 
interim orders, the Indian government may in turn see not only improved 
economic output, but also reduced financial waste in their governing.118 
Yet, as it stands now, “[t]he question remains as to whether the right to 
food as articulated in PUCL can survive India’s liberalization policies, or 
whether, in contrast, PUCL will have the effect of modifying or reversing 
                                                                                                                           
 
110 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 2 S.C.R. 1136 (India) (Interim Order 
dated November 28, 2001); see also Birchfield & Corsi, Starvation, supra note 96, at 736. 
111Birchfield & Corsi, Starvation, supra note 96, at 736. 
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Reduce Their Agricultural Subsidies if Progress is to be Made in Market Access (Aug. 27, 2003)). 
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these policies.”119 Moreover, “while PUCL has established the right to food 
as a constitutionally protected entitlement requiring affirmative government 
action to ensure its fulfillment, protection, and promotions, it remains an 
open case and its entitlements have not yet been secured in a final 
judgment.”120 Fortunately for the effected Indian citizens, commentators and 
observers of the matter have indicated that it is likely that the case will end 
in the rendering of a final judgment that will not only enshrine the right to 
food in India, but also bind the government to continued observation of said 
right.121 
V. CONCLUSION 
The first and most obvious conclusion to draw from PUCL and Indian 
jurisprudence is that judicial enforcement of the economic, social, and 
cultural rights articulated domestically in the Indian Constitution and 
internationally in the ICESCR is, in fact, possible. The manner through which 
India has progressed towards judicial enforcement also goes a long way to 
undermine the criticisms commonly thrown at the notion that economic, 
social, and cultural rights do not belong in the courtroom alongside civil and 
political rights. 
Although Neier claims that granting courts jurisdiction over positive 
rights amounts to “carv[ing] the heart out of [the democratic] process,” the 
Indian model shows that, at times, doing so may in fact serve to supplement 
failures in the democratic, legislative process.122 As they stand now, the 
interim orders “embody the unique and important function of [economic, 
social, and cultural rights litigation] to combat governmental failings.”123 In 
fact, when viewed as a whole, because the Indian system for the enforcement 
of positive rights was premised on judicial populism and “the idea that the 
court has a duty to provide redress for human rights violations where the 
legislature has failed to do so and because this reasoning is in turn based on 
the idea that the legislature cannot provide the average citizen with adequate 
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redress,” the Indian model may fairly be viewed as effectuating the will of 
the people when those elected have failed to do so.124 If one of the “purpose[s] 
of the democratic process” is to ensure “the public safety,” then it would be 
difficult to argue that the judicial enforcement of the right to food in PUCL 
runs contrary to said purpose.125 
Furthermore, tracking the transformation of Indian food schemes such 
as the MDMS from the complete state of disarray they were in prior to the 
beginning of the PUCL litigation to their current efficient and effective 
operation, critics may have difficulty in arguing that the Supreme Court was 
not competent and lacked “the expertise to examine the complex issues that 
arise from the development of social policy and the allocation of scarce 
resources.”126 While it is true that PUCL has been disruptive to India’s prior 
economic policies, and, should a final judgment be issued, require significant 
changes to said policies, “[w]hether or not these changes will take place . . . 
cannot diminish the legal significance of PUCL or the significance it has 
had . . . to India’s hungry and starving.”127 
While the status of India as a pioneer of economic, social, and cultural 
rights should be acknowledged, so too should its potential to be a model for 
the enforcement of these rights for the now one hundred sixty-six (166) 
countries128 that have ratified and accepted the legal obligations of the 
ICESCR.129 Truthfully with regards to the right to food articulated in the 
ICESR at Article 11(1), the Indian model may serve more developed and 
industrialized countries better than it served India itself as the governmental 
subsidization of food distribution should, if the government of India’s 
position is to be accepted, have less of an economic impact on countries 
whose citizens derive their wealth from means other than agriculture.130 
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If the world wishes to hold true to the foundational belief of the UDHR, 
the “universal recognition that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are 
inherent to all human beings, inalienable and equally applicable to 
everyone,” then it must recognize that the citizens of the world must have 
access to the courts to ensure that all of their rights are protected.131 If the 
world’s courts remain open only to one set of rights, negative, civil and 
political rights, then the people of the world are effectively deprived of half 
of the rights that they are entitled to under the IBHR. The importance of civil 
and political rights should not be minimized or overlooked, but neither 
should the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights. A person’s 
right to food, water, shelter, and a decent living are the rights that quite 
literally ensure their survival. If the courts of the world are to remain a tool 
for people to ensure that their rights are protected, then these indispensable 
rights must find their place in the courtroom. 
                                                                                                                           
 
Subsidies if Progress Is to be Made in Market Access (Aug. 27, 2003), http://comerce.nic.in/PressRelease/ 
pressrelease-detail.asp?id=237). 
131 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, supra note 3. 
